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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
point 0 and then discussed the privileges which the law grants to
indigents.
First, the court noted that CPLR 1102(d) waives jury fees.91 Second,
it concluded that, while no statute waives witness fees, failure of the
city or county to absorb the cost would deny to the poor equal access
to the courts.02 Third, it held that the fourteenth amendment encom-
passes "the right of an indigent to assigned counsel.., to defend his
right to remain in possession of his dwelling. . . .93 The trial court
was directed to assign counsel, if such were not available to defendant
through a public or semi-public agency. 4
This decision confirms Professor McLaughlin's prescient observa-
tions that "[ilt was only a matter of time before [application of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect the
indigent] would percolate into the field of civil litigation," and that
"much more will be heard... about the right of the indigent in civil
litigation."'05
Of course, whether the public must absorb the substantial cost of
providing attorneys to indigent tenants in nonpayment of rent cases,
and perhaps in other actions, is a matter ultimately resolvable by the
United States Supreme Court.
ARTICLE 15 - ACTIONS AGAINST PERSONS JOINTLY LIABLE
CPLR 1502: A proceeding pursuant to article 75 can be a subsequent
action.
When a co-obligor was not summoned in the original action,
CPLR 1502 requires a subsequent action against him in order to pro-
cure a judgment enforceable against his individually held property.96
00 Tenant made a prima fade showing of indigency by her affidavit stating she
was a recipient of public assistance and was without assets; and her sworn denial
that she owed any rent was a sufficient showing of merit to support the motion.
It was therefore error to deny her application for leave to defend as a poor person
(CPLR 1101).
Id. at 834, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 140. Accord, Emerson v. Emerson, 33 App. Div. 2d 1022, 308
N.Y.S.2d 691 (2d Dep't 1970).
9166 Misc. at 834, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
92 Id., citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 371 (1971); Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc.
2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968),discussed in The Quarterly Survey,
46 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 147, 157 (1971); The Quarterly Survey, 44 id. 135, 139 (1969).
93 Id. at 835, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 141, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377
(1971); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
04 Id. at 836, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 142, citing People ex rel. Baumgart v. Martin, 9 N.Y.2d
851, 174 N.E.2d 475, 214 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1961).
95 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 1102, supp. commentary at 110 (1969).
06 See Funaro v. Houston, 19 Misc. 2d 1078, 193 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1959) (the court applied CPA 1201, the predecessor to CPLR 1502).
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This provision restates the law as set forth in CPA sections 1185 and
1201.9 1Whether a proceeding, pursuant to article 75, to confirm an arbi-
trator's award sufficiently complies with the statutory language demand-
ing the commencing of an "action" has recently been answered by the
Appellate Division, First Department, in Lauratex Textile v. Gorin.98
The petitioner proceeded to arbitration after a dispute arose with
the respondent. At the time the petitioner was under the mistaken im-
pression that Gorin was the sole proprietor of the Herald Textile Com-
pany. During proceedings supplementary to execution of the judgment
entered on the arbitrator's award, he discovered that respondent Lo-
Pinto was partner in the business. Lauratex moved to amend the judg-
ment to add LoPinto as a judgment debtor. Only Gorin had been served
with notice of motion, however, so the court, citing CPLR 1502, denied
the motion. The petitioner then served both Gorin and LoPinto and
moved for confirmation of the award against both. The court again
denied the motion, on the ground that the new steps were not in com-
pliance with CPLR 1502.
On appeal, the appellate division rejected the respondents' conten-
tion that the petitioner should have started an entirely new proceeding
under article 75 against both parties to confirm the award. It ruled that
Lauratex had sufficiently complied with CPLR 1502 and article 75 to
warrant a confirmation of the arbitrator's award against both parties.99
The court concluded that there is no reason why the provisions of
CPLR 1502 cannot be applied to a "proceeding under Article 75, the
end product of which, as in an action, is to be a judgment."'00 The court
based this conclusion on CPLR 103(b)101 and (c). 10 2
At first glance, the Lauratex decision seems to be a laudable effort
by the court to avert attempts to delay the judicial process through re-
liance on form rather than substance. However, it becomes clear that
the result is achieved without due regard to section 1502. In its eager-
ness to provide the petitioner with relief, the court has overlooked the
97 CPLR 1502 combines both these sections. Section 1185 had authorized a subsequent
action "when the co-obligor had not been summoned." Section 1201 had authorized such
an action "when the co-obligor had neither been joined nor secured." 2A WK&M 1502.01.
98 37 App. Div. 2d 540, 322 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Ist Dep't 1971).
99 See 7B McINNEY's CPLR 1502, supp. commentary at 139 (1964): "In the second
action the first judgment is not res judicata, since the statute mandates that the second
action proceed as though the first one had not been brought."
100 37 App. Div. 2d at 541, 322 N.YS.2d at 77.
101 CPLR 103 (b): "[Pirocedure in special proceedings shall be the same as in actions,
and the provisions of the civil practice law and rules applicable to actions shall be ap-
plicable to special proceedings."
102 CPLR 103(c): "[A] civil proceeding shall not be dismissed solely because it is not
brought in the proper form." Discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JonN's L REv. 688,
689 (1969).
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fact that by granting petitioner's motion to add LoPinto as a judgment
debtor it denies the latter's right to argue the merits, as provided for by
1502.103
ARTICLE 20 - MISTAKES, DEFECTS, IRREGULARITIES AND EXTENSIONS
oF TIME
CPLR 2001: Failure to state court and county in summons is a juris-
dictional defect.
Despite the legislative mandate that "... [a] defect in the form of
a paper, if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced, shall be disre-
garded by the court, and leave to correct shall be freely given,"u 4 the
courts have not allowed all defects to be so corrected. They have drawn
a distinction between summonses with mistakes in form and those with
jurisdictional defects. The former may be corrected or disregarded; 105
the latter may not.0
In Tamburo v. P. & C. Food Markets, Inc.,07 the Appellate Divi-
sion, Fourth Department, decided that a summons which fails to specify
the court and county in which it is returnable is jurisdictionally defec-
tive. Thus, the summons could not be amended nunc pro tunc and fail-
ure to return it was not a waiver of the omission. 108 A supplementary
summons would be futile, for the statute of limitations had run.109
That the summons was void and not merely irregular is technically
correct insofar as there is case law to support it. But it should be noted
that the two cases providing this support were decided in 1851.110 The
103 CPLR 1502: "The defendant in the subsequent action may raise any defenses or
counterclaims that he might have raised in the original action if the summons had been
served on him when it was first served on a co-obligor, and may raise objections to the
original judgments, and defenses or counterclaims that have arisen since it was entered."
104 CPLR 2101(f).
105 CPLR 2001 states:
At any stage of an action, the court may permit a mistake, omission, defect or
irregularity to be corrected, upon such terms as may be just, or, if a substantial
right of a party is not prejudiced, the- mistake, omission, defect or irregularity
shall be disregarded.
See, eg., Barron v. Hadcox, 47 Misc. 2d 435, 262 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County
1965); D'Alessandra v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 106 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. Kihgs
County 1951).
106 E.g., Rockefeller v. Hein, 176 Misc. 659, 28 N.YS.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1941) stated that CPA 105, predecessor of CPLR 2001, could not be utilized where there was
a jurisdictional error.
107 36 App. Div. 2d 1017, 321 N.Y.S.2d 487 (4th Dep't 1970).
108 CPLR 2101(f.
109 36 App. Div. 2d at 1017, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
110 Dix v. Palmer & Schoolcraft, 5 How. Pr. 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1851)
(dictum); James v. Kirkpatrick, 5 How. Pr. 241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1851).
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